


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IC 77-2545

23 DEC 1977

SIGNATURE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon
Acting Deputy to the DCI for
the Intelligence Community

SUBJECT: A Management Plan for Nuclear Test Monitoring and
Test Ban Treaty Implementation

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REFERENCE: Chronology of CTBIWG Activities dated 20 December 1977
DOE review
completed.

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1. Action Requested: [] You have been requested by the NSC/SCC to provide a management plan for the full range of nuclear test monitoring and test ban implementation. The plan, with an appropriate transmitting memorandum for your signature to Dr. Brzezinski, is attached. Request you approve the plan and sign the memorandum.

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2. Background: [] The plan, prepared by a representative panel of the NFIB Comprehensive Test Ban Intelligence Working Group (CTBIWG), proposes a formal mechanism for managing the monitoring/verification of a comprehensive test ban, and, in the interim, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosives Treaties (TTBT/PNET). It addresses roles, tasking, management structure, inter-national monitoring activities, data exchange and integration, national technical means, the Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS). As requested by the NSC/SCC, the plan provides a means by which US intelligence and non-intelligence monitoring/verification capabilities can be managed and utilized most effectively.

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3. Staff Position: [] The plan was circulated among NFIB membership, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) and

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USAF review(s)
completed.

NSC review(s)
completed.

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SUBJECT: A Management Plan for Nuclear Test Monitoring and Test
Ban Treaty Implementation


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the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) for review and comment
and later for concurrence. All have concurred.

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4. Recommendation: That you approve the plan and sign the
memorandum to Dr. Brzezinski.

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John N. McMahon

Attachment:

Memo to Dr. Brzezinski for signature
with attached Management Plan for
Nuclear Test Monitoring and Test
Ban Treaty Implementation

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN INTELLIGENCE

WORKING GROUP CHRONOLOGY

1. On 23 June 1977, the Chairman, NFIB, established an interagency Comprehensive Test Ban Intelligence Working Group (CTBIWG). The tasks assigned to that group were to culminate in a report due to NFIB on 15 August 1977:

- o Examination of roles, missions, activities in the monitoring and verification of the proposed CTB.
- o Address the interrelationship among Community elements and other government agencies and organizations.
- o Determine requirements for intelligence in support of CTB verification.
- o Establish relationship between CTB and nuclear proliferation intelligence activities.
- o Propose options for the coordination and management of interagency CTB activities.

2. On 28 June 1977, the CTBIWG convened its first meeting and set the requirements which addressed the following:

- o Preparation of the current mechanism for CTB policy and negotiation support. (This input on hand.)
- o Preparation on an inventory of Community resources, capabilities, organizations, roles, missions, interrelationships of product, collection, and resources. (This input on hand.)
- o Establishment of monitoring requirements and capabilities. (Task deferred pending completion of an ACDA verification capabilities paper.)
- o Establishment of IC organization and procedures (Task deferred pending completion of the above three tasks.).

3. On 19 July 1977, an SCC Work Program for CTB discussions was established in a White House memorandum signed by David Aaron. The directive encompassed the development of verification criteria options/

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alternatives and a proposed interagency management plan to ensure effective utilization of all government resources in monitoring a CTB agreement. The work program was initially segmented into four basic tasks. A fifth task was added later:

- o Task I - Contribution of automatic seismic installations (ASI) to CTB verification.
- o Task II - Analysis of CTB evasion (excluding atmosphere, space, or underwater evasion which was treated in the PRM-16 response).
- o Task III - A CTB safeguards plan.
- o Task IV - A. Management of CTB verification resources
B. Review of a U.S. National Technical Means
- o Task V - On-site inspections (OSI)

Elements of the SCC Work Program, particularly those involving a management plan for monitoring a CTB, are integral and were considered precursor to the report requirement of the CTBIWG as set forth in the Chairman's NFIB 23 June 1977 memorandum. As a result, the 15 August 1977 submission data set for the Community report to NFIB was adjusted to conform to the schedule of the SCC program which anticipated completion of its work in late September.

4. On 27 September 1977, the SCC Work Program was completed and its report presented to the NSC/SCC. Guidance emanating from that meeting was twofold: first, the DCI, in collaboration with DoD, will examine the management organization of the national technical means (NTM) for verification; second, the DCI will evaluate Task IV of the SCC Work Program and recommend a Community course of action.

5. On 11 October 1977, the NSC/SCC CTB Working Group met to discuss the guidance outlined by David Aaron at the 27 September meeting described above and to establish follow-on tasks. These tasks were assigned as follows:

- o Permitted experiments under a CTB - ACDA and DoE
- o Safeguards plan - DoE and DNA
- o Program to improve NTM - NSC/OSTP
- o Development of a management plan - DCI/ICS

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6. On 27 October 1977, the NFIB's CTBIWG convened to address the above NSC guidance. The Working Group established a Panel to develop the management plan. Chaired by the IC Staff, the Panel consisted of representatives from CIA, DIA, DoE and DoD (DIA and ARPA).

7. The Panel's "Nuclear Test Monitoring and Test Ban Implementation: A Management Plan" was circulated for review and comment within the CTBIWG. A revised text was then submitted for review and comment to NFIB membership and ACDA. A new version was prepared taking into account comments made by the principals and circulated for review and comment among NFIB, JAEIC and ACDA. On 14 December 1977, all addressees had concurred.

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

IAN 23 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Management Plan for Nuclear Test Monitoring and
Test Ban Implementation


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25X1 The attached management plan for "Nuclear Test Monitoring and Test Ban Implementation" was developed in response to a recent request of the NSC Special Coordination Committee and is concurred in by the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Specifically, the plan offers a formal mechanism for managing the monitoring/verification of a comprehensive test ban and, in the interim, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). I have reviewed the issues involved and believe the plan provides a sound basis on which to proceed.

SIGNED

STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment:
Management Plan for Nuclear
Test Monitoring and Test
Ban Implementation



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NUCLEAR TEST MONITORING AND TEST BAN

TREATY IMPLEMENTATION:

A MANAGEMENT PLAN

January 1978

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NUCLEAR TEST MONITORING AND TEST BAN TREATY IMPLEMENTATION:

A MANAGEMENT PLAN

Executive Summary

1. This plan was prepared in response to a request from the NSC/SCC Test Ban Working Group to propose a mechanism for effective orchestration of the full range of activities involved in (a) monitoring compliance by other treaty parties by US national technical means, and (b) implementing bilateral and multilateral activities provided for in the treaties (including those which supplement national technical means). The proposed plan would apply to a comprehensive test ban (CTB) and, in the interim, to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET). The plan was prepared at the direction of the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), by a group under the chairmanship of the Intelligence Community Staff (IC Staff) with representation from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Department of Energy (DoE), and Arms Control Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

2. The plan proposes that the DCI, with the advice of NFIB and a newly established special working group, oversee the intelligence functions involved in the treaty monitoring process. An International Activities Steering Group would oversee such cooperative measures as data exchange, on-site inspection and operation of in-country seismic stations (to the extent these are provided for in the treaties).

3. Under the DCI, a Nuclear Test Monitoring Working Group (NTMWG) would be established as an adjunct to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC). It will operate independently of JAEIC in its monitoring functions and prepare technical monitoring reports consistent with NFIB guidance. Working Group responsibilities encompass treaty signatories and non-signatories alike. Additionally, the NTMWG would advise the DCI through JAEIC on technical requirements and resource matters concerning test monitoring.

4. The plan leaves flexible a number of details regarding reporting, review and the like, but no major issues are anticipated. The proposed structure is not intended to replace or substitute for the DCI's resource and tasking staffs--Resource Management Staff (RMS) and Collection Tasking Staff (CTS)--or existing line managers in the nuclear test area. Rather, the functional elements in the plan are intended to identify and focus attention on problems in the test ban verification area for higher level review and decisions.

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NUCLEAR TEST MONITORING AND TEST BAN TREATY IMPLEMENTATION:

A MANAGEMENT PLAN

I. Introduction

Implementation of new treaties limiting nuclear testing will lead to a variety of international and unilateral US activities involving several departments and agencies. The international activities consist of both bilateral US-USSR and multilateral undertakings provided for in the treaties. The unilateral US activities are concerned with the monitoring and verification process. This process consists of three basic elements, the second and third of which constitute "monitoring" activities:

- formulation of policy guidance for US verification activities;

- data collection, together with related analysis, to generate the set of information needed for the verification process; and

- integration of data from all sources (including data derived from international activities), together with additional analysis and preparation of technical monitoring reports.

These three steps provide a basis for the policy process of interpreting monitoring information in the context of treaty obligations, taking into account political and legal considerations (i.e., treaty "verification") and pursuing follow-up actions when appropriate.

The present approach for managing and coordinating each of these steps is not sufficiently focused to satisfy test ban verification requirements. There is a need for an integrated interagency monitoring/verification structure under NSC guidance. The purpose of this paper is to propose an approach to orchestrate these activities more effectively. At the request of the NSC Staff, both the intelligence activities and the international activities are dealt with in this paper; this is useful since there clearly will be a need to coordinate both types of activity.

This plan is intended to be broad enough to cover implementation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET) in the near term, and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at some future date. (Even under a CTBT, there may be a need to continue to monitor LTBT compliance by countries which are parties to the LTBT but not the CTBT.) In view of the

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long-term significance of a CTB, which would eliminate the various TTBT/PNET activities, emphasis in the paper is on activities stemming from a CTBT.

The proposed plan is intended to be consistent with the new E.O. which will replace E.O. 11905 and PD-17. It assigns each major activity to the department or agency deemed most appropriate, or indicates options for such assignments.

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II. The Overall Plan

Implementation of test ban treaties involves two distinct but related activities: (a) monitoring compliance by other states party to the treaties; and, (b) coordinating U.S. participation in the international activities provided for by the treaties and associated protocols.^{1/}

This plan provides for establishment of two mechanisms to coordinate these activities. For the purpose of test ban treaty monitoring/verification, both will operate under the general guidance of the Special Coordination Committee (SCC). The structure and major functions are shown in Figure 1.

A. Test Ban Monitoring

The principal body responsible for monitoring would be a Nuclear Test Monitoring Working Group (experts level), to be established as an adjunct to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) but independent of JAEIC in its monitoring functions. In support of the Working Group, those elements of the Intelligence Community involved in the nuclear intelligence process would undertake data collection and analysis of the data. The Working Group, drawing on this input, would be responsible for the integration of data and analyses from various sources and preparation of technical monitoring reports. These reports would not make determinations as to whether there has been treaty violations, but they would include all of the information needed by the policy elements of the Government to interpret the monitoring information in the context of treaty obligations.

The process would be closely analogous to the SALT monitoring process which has been in operation in the Intelligence Community for the past five years. However, to a much greater degree than in SALT, there are resources dedicated principally or entirely to collection and analysis of data bearing on the monitoring of test ban

^{1/} For simplicity, "international activities" is used in this paper to refer to bilateral U.S.-USSR activities under the TTBT/PNET and to both bilateral and multilateral activities under a CTBT.

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limitations. It would therefore be the additional responsibility of the Working Group to act as an advisory body to the DCI and his staff and to the NFIB in order to ensure an adequate focus on technical requirements and resource posture for test ban monitoring.^{2/}

B. Test Ban International Activities

The Test Ban International Activities Steering Group would operate under the general guidance of the Special Coordination Committee (SCC). It would be responsible for implementing actions in relation to the USSR or other treaty parties in accordance with provisions for the various international activities shown in Figure 1, and for developing recommendations when higher policy-level consideration is needed.

The TTBT and PNET provide for a variety of bilateral US-USSR activities including: an exchange of data on nuclear weapons test sites; detailed data on two calibration tests; post-shot information on locations of all future nuclear weapon tests; providing detailed information on PNEs; and under certain conditions access to the site to carry out elaborate procedures for PNEs. These activities will be coordinated through a bilateral US-USSR Joint Consultative Commission (JCC), patterned on the SALT Standing Consultative Commission. Under a CTBT, it is anticipated that there will continue to be extensive US-USSR bilateral activities and, in addition, various multilateral activities.

Although these international activities would generate information which might usefully supplement US national technical means of verification, the principal coordination activities would involve diplomatic and operational questions rather than the flow of monitoring data. Under a CTB, the Test Ban International Activities Steering Group would coordinate such matters as consultations on compliance questions involving the Soviets or other treaty parties; US participation in the installation and servicing of agreed seismic equipment in the USSR and the United States; the international exchange of seismic data; assistance to selected countries in improving their own seismic

^{2/} It should be noted that the JAEIC is presently responsible for making such recommendations relative to monitoring the LTBT (in fulfillment of Safeguard "d").

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capabilities; arranging and carrying out on-site inspections in the USSR or other countries party to the treaty. The issues expected to arise would therefore be technical/diplomatic issues. There should be no particular problems in relation to the flow of data from these international activities to the Intelligence Community.

The Test Ban International Activities Steering Group would be made up of senior policy officers (Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary level) representing the principal national security departments and agencies. Much of the work of the Steering Group would be delegated to interagency working groups or task forces at the experts level, established to coordinate the specialized activities outlined above. Figure 2 illustrates the data flow for both the monitoring and international activities relating to the test ban treaties.

C. Coordination

To ensure adequate coordination between the monitoring and international activities, the DCI and the chairman of the International Activities Steering Group, or their designated representatives, will be kept informed of the activities and invited to attend meetings of the other. Appropriate steps will be taken to ensure close liaison at the experts level as well.

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III. The Monitoring Task

The Nuclear Test Monitoring Working Group (NTMWG), acting under the guidance of the NFIB, serves as the focal point for the review and coordination of U.S. national activities contributing to monitoring foreign nuclear testing.

A. Functions of the Monitoring Working Group

The Nuclear Test Monitoring Working Group has as its functions:

1. To prepare reports on foreign nuclear test activities for the NFIB and subsequent forwarding through the DCI to the SCC and to the President. JAEIC currently prepares an annual report on LTBT compliance. The Working Group would be assigned this responsibility for monitoring compliance with the LTBT and for preparing routine reports on TTBT compliance (annually) and CTBT compliance (semiannually) when these treaties enter into force.

2. To provide advice and recommendations to the DCI and NFIB on:

- a. NTM resource posture

- b. NTM tasking and operations^{3/}

3. To provide a focal point for review and coordination of Community analysis and appropriate review of test ban monitoring functions.

The Working Group would be responsible for monitoring all foreign nuclear testing by treaty signatories and non-signatories alike. Initially, the treaty monitoring functions will be limited to monitoring Soviet compliance with the TTBT and PNET. Under a CTBT, there would be a

^{3/} Implementation and staffing of the recommendations made by the NTMWG is intended to be consistent with those resource and tasking elements established by the DCI under the new E.O. which will replace E.O. 11905 and PD-17.

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requirement for monitoring compliance by other parties, but Soviet compliance would continue to be the highest priority monitoring responsibility.

The Working Group would be primarily a body of technical experts on nuclear test detection activities. The DCI, in consultation with NFIB, would appoint the Chairman of the Working Group. It is envisioned that the Working Group membership will include NFAC, CTS, CIA, State/INR, DoE, DIA, NSA, [redacted] with representatives [redacted] ARPA, ACDA, and other agencies as appropriate. [redacted] would be expected to attend only those NTMWG and JAEIC meetings that pertain to requirements and resource questions and recommendations.)

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There is a question of the division of responsibility between the Working Group, which would specialize in nuclear test detection and treaty monitoring, and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), which currently coordinates the full range of technical intelligence activities in relation to foreign nuclear programs. As an interim measure, the Nuclear Test Monitoring Working Group could be established as an adjunct to JAEIC.

--Recommendations on resource posture would be fully coordinated with JAEIC prior to submission to the appropriate intelligence program manager and DCI staff element. JAEIC would examine them in the context of competing nuclear intelligence requirements.

--JAEIC would be kept fully informed of all Working Group activities to ensure adequate coordination of all nuclear intelligence matters and to avoid duplication of or gaps in activities.

It is intended, however, to avoid layering in the preparation of monitoring reports. Under this plan the NTMWG would function independent of JAEIC and submit draft monitoring reports directly to the NFIB and DCI without review by JAEIC. After a trial period of about a year, a review should be made regarding the future responsibilities and relationship of JAEIC and the NTMWG (Figure 3).

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Regarding the relationship of the Working Group to the Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS):⁴ The AEDS will collect and analyze the data and provide reports to the NTMWG under procedures and in a format established by the NTMWG. A technically competent group of experts operating under the auspices of the NTMWG would periodically review AEDS analytical methodologies and make recommendations to the NTMWG regarding any changes. The NTMWG would operate as an interface between other agencies concerned with test ban monitoring and the AEDS. The NTMWG would have access to AEDS data on a continuing basis. Other requests for access to AEDS data would be through the NTMWG which would make the final determination.

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IV. The International Activities Task

As noted earlier, there are important bilateral U.S.-USSR activities under the TTBT/PNET, and both bilateral and multilateral activities are anticipated under a CTBT. Under a CTBT, for example, these would include such diplomatic/technical matters as consultations on compliance questions involving the Soviets or other treaty parties; U.S. participation in the installation and servicing of agreed seismic equipment in the USSR and the U.S.; the international exchange of seismic data; assistance to selected countries in improving their own seismic capabilities; arranging and carrying out on-site inspections in the USSR or other countries party to the treaty. Although these activities would generate information which might usefully supplement NTM, they are concerned primarily with diplomatic and operational issues rather than monitoring issues per se. Participation in these activities would, in general, involve the policy (rather than intelligence) elements of the various departments and agencies.

A. Operations

1. Areas of Responsibility

There will be extensive bilateral activities to be carried out under the provisions of the TTBT and PNET.

TTBT. The Protocol of the TTBT provides for the U.S. and USSR to undertake the following activities:

- simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification, an exchange of data including the locations and geophysical characteristics of nuclear test sites and data on two calibration tests (including yield, data, time, depth, coordinates);

- thereafter, the locations of all nuclear weapon tests after they have been conducted;

- notification in advance of any plans to specify a new nuclear weapons test area, and provision of data as noted above.

PNET. The PNET provides for much more extensive bilateral U.S.-USSR activities. It provides for the establishment of a Joint Consultative Commission (JCC) to serve as a framework for consultations on questions of compliance and ambiguous situations, questions of intended interference with national technical means of

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verification, new circumstances which may have a bearing on the treaty, and possible amendments to the treaty. (It is likely that the JCC will serve a similar role in relation to the TTBT, which provides for consultations but does not specify a mechanism.)

The Protocol to the PNET specifies in detail information which a country carrying out a PNE is required to provide to the other party, the details depending on the yield of the explosion or explosions. Under certain circumstances, including planned multiple PNE events with aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons, the Protocol provides for access to the site and carrying out of elaborate procedures to ensure that no single PNE device has a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. For events with aggregate yield exceeding 500 kilotons, the Protocol provides for installation of a local seismic network.

CTBT. With successful conclusion of a CTBT, the bilateral activities associated with the TTBT/PNET would be replaced by a combination of multilateral, bilateral (US-USSR) [redacted] activities. Although the final provisions of a CTB remain to be negotiated, it is anticipated that the multilateral treaty will provide for:

--establishment of an international consultative commission to serve as a forum for exchanging evidence regarding compliance (but not determining whether there had been violations);

--establishment of an international exchange of seismic data, including information about participating seismic stations and the data from those stations;

--seeking on-site inspections to clarify the nature of suspicions or ambiguous events.

In addition to the provisions of the multilateral treaty, consideration is being given to the possibility of a bilateral US-USSR agreement providing for consultation on compliance questions, on-site inspection provisions, and installation of authenticated seismic stations on the territory of the other party. If the Soviets agree to the provision for in-country stations,

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and there is agreement on locations in the USSR (and the US), this would lead to a requirement for:

- conducting noise surveys of proposed sites;
- installation of the seismic equipment under agreed procedures with regard to permitted equipment, time periods, etc.;
- maintenance of seismic station equipment under agreed procedures;
- replacement of equipment, if desired, at agreed intervals.

There will be provisions under the CTBT for bilateral US-USSR consultations regarding compliance issues, possible interference with NTM, etc. Planning and supporting such consultations will be a function of the International Activities Steering Group.

2. Participating Agencies

The international activities generated by the TTBT and PNET, and those expected to be generated by the CTBT, involve contributions from the principal departments and agencies concerned with national security and arms control:

- State and ACDA would be concerned with the general diplomatic requirement of implementing the provisions of the treaties.

- DoD would be concerned with the national security implications of treaty implementation, including contributing to enhancing US technical capabilities in support of the various international activities.

- DoE would take the lead in staffing all on-site inspection visits, and would contribute to enhancing US technical capabilities in support of the various international activities.

--DCI would ensure that no legitimate opportunity to collect information useful to the monitoring task was lost, and that all data collected through international activities were made available expeditiously to the Intelligence Community to supplement data from NTM.

--DOI--USGS would continue to be involved in activities relating to international exchange of seismic data.

3. Steering Group Operation

The Test Ban International Activities Steering Group would be chaired by a senior officer of one of the policy agencies--probably by the U.S. Commissioner to the US-USSR Joint Consultative Commission (JCC). Members would be policy officers at the Assistant Secretary or Deputy Assistant Secretary level. ACDA would provide necessary staff support.

The Steering Group would meet at established intervals to deal with routine matters, and probably would hold a series of meetings in preparation for such activities as a session of the Joint Consultative Commission. It would resolve differences among the agencies when possible, and implement or propose for higher level consideration approaches to the various international activities under its purview. Issues which could not be resolved by the Steering Group would be passed to the SCC for resolution.

In relation to possible compliance issues, reports from the DCI/NFIB to the SCC indicating a potential problem could lead the NSC to task the International Activities Steering Group to study possible US courses of action under treaty provisions and to prepare an options paper for SCC consideration.

To carry out its responsibilities, the Steering Group probably would establish a working group for each of the functions shown in Figure 2. Each group would be chaired by an expert involved on a regular basis in the activities of the working group (e.g., international exchange of seismic data, on-site inspection, installation and maintenance of in-country seismic stations). In this way the Steering Group and its working groups would constitute a forum for interagency consultations on all facets of test ban international activities.

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c. Summary

A recapitulation of the international seismic activities envisioned under a CTBT follows:

--Updating of some of the international seismic stations would be supported by the United States (DoD, DoE, and/or DOI [USGS]).


--AEDS would have access to all international seismic data as noted in Section III.

--International data would be merged with similar AEDS data as part of the US nuclear test monitoring process.

--A Washington, D.C., based data center would house or provide: (1) interface with AEDS analytical function; (2) seismic data reception, preprocessing, and storage of data received from stations in other countries parties to the treaty; and, (3) interface with other international data centers.

3. On-Site Inspection

The decision to seek an on-site inspection (OSI) would be made at the highest political level. Once an OSI had been authorized, the Steering Group would coordinate preparations for raising the matter with the USSR (or other treaty parties) through appropriate channels. The Steering Group, in close cooperation with the lead agency (DoE), would also coordinate the execution of any authorized OSI.



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Final reports prepared by the inspection teams would be forwarded to the SCC through the International Activities Working Group. They would be provided simultaneously to the Monitoring Working Group for independent comment to the NFIB and to the SCC.

C. Resource Management

The resources involved in the various international activities are integral to operational and R&D elements of the participating

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departments and agencies. The International Activities Steering Group would be expected to assess resources available bearing on the capability of the US to carry out the various international activities provided for by the treaties and to ensure optimum contributions to the monitoring process. Final decisions regarding these resources would be the responsibility of each agency.

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